China does not currently have a civilian SNR program, although China has researched and expressed interest in building HEU SNRs. This makes China a Tier 2 state in our categorization.

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China made its nuclear ambitions in space known when aspirational claims were made by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, the country’s leading rocket developer and manufacturer, on the front page of People’s Daily in November 2017. [1] It declared that a fleet of nuclear tug rockets and “reusable hybrid-power carriers” would conduct “regular, large scale” interplanetary flights and carry out commercial exploration and mining missions by the mid-2040s. Li Hong, director of the academy, boasted that, “by 2045, China will have the best transportation system in space.” Other Chinese experts, however, were more skeptical and conscious of safety concerns, noting that, “safety issues will be the top challenge for the Chinese nuclear fleet. If they fall down [to earth], it will cause a global nuclear disaster”. Another expert went further, calling the goals “impossible to achieve.” [2] It appears that these statements were referring to nuclear thermal propulsion, and were made in response to NASA’s Nuclear Thermal Propulsion project, which began two months earlier in September 2017, while the "hybrid-power carriers" were referring to other systems. [3]

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In the summer of 2019, an international military expert testified before the US Congress that “China intends to be the #1 space power by 2045. At the highest levels of PRC policy, China has set itself a goal to exceed all others by 2049 in time for its 100-year celebration of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China,” and that therefore, “the U.S. needs to take the Chinese space goals and timelines seriously.” [4] She warned that China has “a head start in the new space race” and is “the only country to articulate a long-term vision of space settlement and utilization.” [5]

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China’s clear aspirations to use nuclear technology in space must be analyzed in light of the two main contributing factors to achieving those lofty goals:1) China’s ability to develop SNRs domestically based on currently available technology or 2) the potential for enhanced cooperation with a nation that has more experience in SNRs, namely Russia. While China’s ability to develop a simple SNR domestically is unquestioned, the question of whether it can develop an advanced one as part of a propulsion system within the ambitious timetable it has set for itself remains unclear.

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China is on course to become the leader in nuclear power generation sometime before 2030. [6] High-temperature gas-cooled reactors and fast reactors appear to be China’s main priorities [7] – two technologies commonly used in SNRs.  

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Four decades after post-Mao modernizers raised the question of whether China’s nuclear development should rely on indigenous R&D or foreign cooperation, it appears this debate has not been fully settled. [8] Indeed, despite Chinese goals of achieving a self-sufficient nuclear industry, cooperation with Russia is actually increasing, not decreasing, as Russia agreed to build two more power reactors in 2019. [9] Chinese officials stated that Russia’s “unique technologies” led them to choose Russia for cooperation on the project, exemplifying the utility of a joint statement on developing strategic cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy they issued in November 2016. [10]

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More importantly, China’s first fast reactor, the China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR), was built by specialists from the Dollezhal Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (NIKIET) – the very same organization currently constructing Russia’s most advanced mega-watt class SNR. Russia supplied a considerable share of the technology base and key equipment for the CEFR, and continues to contribute to China’s fast reactor program. While a 2009 agreement to build the Gen IV BN-800 fast reactor in China is suspended, the nuclear cooperation agreement signed in November 2016 includes future fast reactor development collaboration. [11] China also may need more Russian help when building its next fast reactor in Xaipu. [12] To this effect, the countries signed an agreement in 2018 that envisages the supply of equipment, fuel, and services for Xaipu’s CNNC-developed CFR-600 demonstration fast reactor project, in a ceremony attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. [13] In fact, improvements in Russia’s BN-600 fast reactor, upon which the CFR-600 is based, are well-known to China’s breeder program through CIAE’s collaboration with Russian R&D institutions. [14] At the same ceremony, Xi and Putin also signed an agreement concerning the supply of radionuclide heat units (UHR) used as parts of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) to power equipment in China's space program for use on lunar exploration missions, meaning that Russia and China are already cooperating on the use of nuclear materials in space. 

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Indeed, Russia-China cooperation in space is as expansive as their cooperation in the nuclear sphere. In 2017, the two governments signed an agreement on joint space exploration between 2018-22 covering five areas: lunar to deep space exploration, special materials development, Earth remote sensing, space debris research and satellite systems. [15] President Vladimir Putin has reportedly discussed supplying advanced rocket engine technology to China, [16] and recently Russia offered to supply rocket engines to China in exchange for Chinese microelectronics. [17]

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In brief, Russian-Chinese cooperation in the areas of both nuclear and space is substantial. In fact, China has a deep history of working with the very Russian organizations it would likely turn to for help in building a SNR. And China may do so, particularly if it feels its space program is falling behind. The examples above demonstrate that China may ask for Russian assistance on an SNR, and Russia would be inclined to accept the offer to curry favor and other concessions from its more powerful partner. 

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At the same time, evidence suggests that Chinese nuclear specialists are closely monitoring the development of Russia’s SNR technology from open sources, possibly in order to copy the technology without foreign assistance and on short notice. A group of academics at the Fundamental Science on Nuclear Safety and Simulation Technology Laboratory of Harbin Engineering University has published papers on the preliminary control-rod configurations for a megawatt-class gas-cooled HEU space nuclear reactor of the same type as Russia’s, [19] and on the computational flow and heat transfer design of such a reactor (see image below). [20] Thus, China may just be waiting to see the effectiveness of the technology proven before copying it later, letting other countries endure the massive costs of R&D, a practice they have been known to do in the aerospace sphere. [21]

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Illustration of RUGK paper reactor proposed by Chinese scientists - Source: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anucene.2019.106986

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There are a few potential reasons why China is not publicly developing SNRs and/or may not be eager to share information about the domestic development of SNRs. One answer is that China’s space program is currently focused on other projects for which SNRs are not necessary, namely, the launch of China’s new large modular space station [22] and China's first ever lunar sample return mission, both scheduled for 2020. [23] Another is that China seems likely to leverage its strength in solar panel technology and production to focus more resources on innovative space-based solar power systems, where it has a competitive advantage. In 2019, Chinese scientists announced a plan to build and launch small to medium-sized solar power stations into the stratosphere to generate electricity between 2021 and 2025, culminating in a megawatt-level space solar power station, slated for construction in 2030, that could beam the power down to earth using microwaves. [24]

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In conclusion, various actors in China have expressed a desire to use nuclear materials in space in the pursuit of both nuclear electric propulsion and nuclear thermal propulsion. China’s desire to be “#1 in space” and close cooperation with Russia mean that it is unlikely to put HEU minimization ahead of its ambitions. However, China uses LEU fuel in its naval propulsion reactors, unlike Russia. While China has not announced the development or launch of a SNR, it has the motive and capability to do so in the mid-term future.

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[1] Stephen Chen, “China’s Nuclear Spaceships Will ‘Mine Asteroids, Fly Tourists’ by 2040,” South China Morning Post, November 17, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120425/chinas-nuclear-spaceships-will-be-mining-asteroids.

[2] Chen, “China’s Nuclear Spaceships”.

[3] Jesse Johnson, “China Hopes to Build Nuclear-Powered Space Shuttle by 2040,” The Japan Times Online, November 18, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/11/18/asia-pacific/science-health-asia-pacific/china-hopes-build-nuclear-powered-space-shuttle-2040/.

[4] Paul Bedard, “China to Mine Moon, Asteroids and Races to Be ‘#1 Space Power by 2045,’” Washington Examiner, July 17, 2019, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/china-to-mine-moon-asteroids-races-to-be-1-space-power-by-2045.

[5]  Namrata Goswami, “China Has a Head Start in the New Space Race,” accessed November 30, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/china-has-a-head-start-in-the-new-space-race/.

[6] Mark Hibbs, “The Future of Nuclear Power in China,” 1. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed November 30, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/14/future-of-nuclear-power-in-china-pub-76311.

[7] “China Nuclear Power | Chinese Nuclear Energy - World Nuclear Association,” accessed November 30, 2019, https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclear-power.aspx.

[8] Hibbs, “The Future of Nuclear Power in China,” 84.

[9] Zheng Yibing, “China and Russia Deepen Nuclear Power Cooperation,” accessed November 30, 2019, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d414e334d444d35457a6333566d54/index.html.

[10] “China Turns to Russia’s ‘Unique Technologies’ to Build New Nuclear Power Plant,” accessed November 30, 2019, https://sputniknews.com/world/201708231056718572-russia-china-nuclear-cooperation/.

[11] Hibbs, “The Future of Nuclear Power in China,” 37.

[12] “China Begins Construction of CFR-600 Fast Reactor - Nuclear Engineering International,” accessed November 30, 2019, https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newschina-begins-construction-of-cfr-600-fast-reactor-6018483.

[13] “China Signs up to Four New Units from Russia - World Nuclear News,” accessed November 30, 2019, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Russia-to-build-four-VVER1200-units-in-China-08061802.html.

[14] Hibbs, “The Future of Nuclear Power in China,” 34.  

[15] “Space Cooperation Between China, Russia Needs Long-Term Mechanism,” accessed November 30, 2019, https://sputniknews.com/science/201709221057600327-space-cooperation-russia-china-mechanism/.

[16] “Russia Offers Rocket Engine Tech as China’s Long March 5 Stalls at Launch,” South China Morning Post, August 28, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3024766/russia-offers-rocket-engine-tech-chinas-long-march-5-struggles.

[17] Hibbs, “The Future of Nuclear Power in China,” 97.

[18] Jeff Daniels, “Chinese Theft of Sensitive US Military Technology Is Still a ‘huge Problem,’ Says Defense Analyst,” CNBC, November 9, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/08/chinese-theft-of-sensitive-us-military-technology-still-huge-problem.html.

[19] “China Readying for Space Station Era: Yang Liwei - Xinhua English.News.Cn,” accessed November 30, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/08/c_137310103.htm.

[20] “China to Launch Chang’e-5 Lunar Probe in 2020,” accessed November 30, 2019, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-10-28/China-to-launch-Chang-e-5-lunar-probe-in-2020-L9pRDXOQ1O/index.html.

[21] Kirsty Needham, “Plans for First Chinese Solar Power Station in Space Revealed,” The Sydney Morning Herald, February 15, 2019, https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/plans-for-first-chinese-solar-power-station-in-space-revealed-20190214-p50xtg.html.

[22] “China to Launch Chang’e-5 Lunar Probe in 2020,” accessed November 30, 2019, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-10-28/China-to-launch-Chang-e-5-lunar-probe-in-2020-L9pRDXOQ1O/index.html.

[24] Kirsty Needham, “Plans for First Chinese Solar Power Station in Space Revealed,” The Sydney Morning Herald, February 15, 2019, https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/plans-for-first-chinese-solar-power-station-in-space-revealed-20190214-p50xtg.html.